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PREFACE 
 
This is the final report on the results of a conversation among 
a group of prestigious Latin American and Caribbean 
academics and practitioners who gathered in Miami, Florida 
in November 2010 to review current regional affairs and 
share their views on the main trends and challenges facing 
2011 and beyond.  The list of participants appears at the end 
of this report.  Rather than determining set conclusions, 
participants offered a variety of appreciations and reflections 
on Latin America and the Caribbean for the immediate and 
medium-range future.   Florida International University’s 
Applied Research Center coordinated the event and 
appreciates the contributions of all participants. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
For the first time in more than fifty years, the domestic and 
external conflicts prevalent in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC) are not primarily ideological in nature.  
Democracy continues to thrive and its promise still inspires 
hope.   In contrast, the illegal production, consumption, and 
trading of drugs – and its links to criminal gangs and 
organizations – represent major challenges to the region, 
undermining several States’ already weak capacity to 
govern.  While LAC macroeconomic stability has remained 
resilient, illegal economies fill the region, often offering 
what some States have not historically been able to provide – 
elements of human security, opportunities for social 
mobility, and basic survival.   
 
Areas controlled by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) 
are now found in Central America, Mexico, and the favelas 
of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, reflecting their competition 
for land routes and production areas.  Cartels such a La 
Familia, Los Zetas, and Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC-
Brazil), among others, operate like trade and financial 
enterprises that manage millions of dollars and resources, 
demonstrating significant business skills in adapting to 
changing circumstances.  They are also merciless in their 
application of violence to preserve their lucrative enterprises.  
The El Salvador-Guatemala-Honduras triangle in Central 
America is now the most violent region in the world, 
surpassing regions in Africa that have been torn by civil 
strife for years.   
 
In Brazil’s favelas and Guatemala’s Petén region, the 
military is leaving the barracks again; not to rule, however, 
but to supplement and even replace the law enforcement 
capacity of weak and discredited police forces.  This will 
challenge the military to apply lessons learned during the 
course of their experience in government, or from the civil 
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wars that plagued the region for nearly 50 years during the 
Cold War.  Will they be able to conduct themselves 
according to the professional ethics that have been inculcated 
over the past 20 years without incurring violations of human 
rights?  Belief in their potential to do good is high according 
to many polls as the Armed Forces still enjoy a favorable 
perception in most societies, despite frequent involvement in 
corruption.  Calling them to fight DTOs, however, may bring 
them too close to the illegal activities they are being asked to 
resist, or even rekindle the view that only a “strong hand” 
can resolve national troubles.  
 
The challenge of governance is occurring as contrasts within 
the region are becoming sharper.  There is an increasing gap 
between nations positioned to surpass their “developing 
nation” status and those that are practically imploding as the 
judicial, political and enforcement institutions fall further 
into the quagmire of illicit activities.  Several South 
American nations are advancing their political and economic 
development.  Brazil in particular has realized macro-
economic stability, made impressive gains in poverty 
reduction, and is on track to potentially become a significant 
oil producer.  It is also an increasingly influential power, 
much closer to the heralded “emerging power” category that 
it aspired to for most of the 20th century.  In contrast, several 
Central American States have become so structurally 
deficient, and have garnered such limited legitimacy, that 
their countries have devolved into patches of State controlled 
and non-State-controlled territory, becoming increasingly 
vulnerable to DTO entrenchment.  
 
In the Caribbean, the drug and human trafficking business 
also thrives.  Small and larger countries are experiencing the 
growing impact of illicit economies and accompanying crime 
and violence.  Among these, Guyana and Suriname face 
greater uncertainty, as they juggle both their internal affairs 
and their relations with Brazil and Venezuela.  Cuba also 
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faces new challenges as it continues focusing on internal 
rather than external affairs and attempts to ensure a stable 
leadership succession while simultaneously trying to reform 
its economy.  Loosening the regime’s tight grip on the 
economy while continuing to curtail citizens’ civil rights will 
test the leadership’s ability to manage change and prevent a 
potential socio-economic crisis from turning into an 
existential threat.  Cuba’s past ideological zest is now in the 
hands of Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, who 
continues his attempts to bring the region together under 
Venezuelan leadership ideologically based on a “Bolivarian” 
anti-U.S. banner, without much success.       
 
The environment and natural disasters will merit more 
attention in the coming years.  Natural events will produce 
increasing scales of destruction as the States in the region 
fail to maintain and expand existing infrastructure to 
withstand such calamities and respond to their effects.  
Prospects for earthquakes, tsunamis, and hurricanes are high, 
particularly in the Caribbean.  In addition, there are growing 
rates of deforestation in nearly every country, along with a 
potential increase in cross-sector competition for resources.  
The losers might be small farmers, due to their inability to 
produce quantities commensurate to larger conglomerates.  
Regulations that could mitigate these types of situations are 
lacking or openly violated with near impunity.  
 
 Indigenous  and other vulnerable populations, including 
African descendants, in several Andean countries, are 
particularly affected by the increasing extraction of natural 
resources taking place amongst their terrain.  This has led to 
protests against extraction activities that negatively affect 
their livelihoods, and in the process, these historically 
underprivileged groups have transitioned from agenda-based 
organization to one that is bringing its claims and grievances 
to the national political agenda, becoming more politically 
engaged.  Symptomatic of these social issues is the region’s 
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chronically poor quality of education that has consistently 
failed to reduce inequality and prepare new generations for 
jobs in the competitive global economy, particularly the 
more vulnerable populations.  Simultaneously, the 
educational deficit is also exacerbated by the erosion of 
access to information and freedom of the press. 
 
The international panorama is also in flux.  New security 
entities are challenging the old establishment.  The Union of 
South American Nations, The South American Defense 
Council, the socialist Bolivarian Alliance, and other entities 
seem to be defying the Organization of American States and 
its own defense mechanisms, and excluding the U.S.  And 
the U.S.’s attention to areas in conflict, namely Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Pakistan – rather than to the more stable 
Latin America and Caribbean – has left ample room for other 
actors to elbow in.  China is now the top trading partner for 
Brazil.  Russian and Iran are also finding new partnerships in 
the region, yet their links appear more politically inclined 
than those of China.   
 
Finally, the aforementioned increasing commercial ties by 
LAC States with China have accelerated a return to the 
preponderance of commodities as sources of income for their 
economies.  The increased extraction of raw material for 
export will produce greater concern over the environmental 
impact that is created by the exploitation of natural 
resources.  These expanded trade opportunities may prove 
counterproductive economically for countries in the region, 
particularly for Brazil and Chile, two countries whose 
economic policies have long sought diversification from 
dependence on commodities to the development of service 
and technology based industries. 
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THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STATE:  RESILIENT, 
TOLERANT, AND VULNERABLE 
 
Regional observers have noted with satisfaction recent 
economic indicators and public polling results, confirming 
that Latin America has avoided the worst effects of the 
global economic recession.  The 2010 findings of the 
AmericasBarometer (LAPOP) shows that while the poor 
indeed were the most affected by the crisis, approximately 
three-fourths of the region’s population retained their jobs, 
and half reported no change in their household income.  The 
United Nations’ Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC) places aggregate regional 
growth for 2010 at 6 percent while estimating that growth in 
the Dominican Republic, Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Uruguay, 
and Paraguay has ranged from as high as 7 to 9.7 percent.1  
LAPOP surveys show a majority of the LAC’s citizens to be 
increasingly satisfied with their governments’ economic 
performance, corresponding with the Santiago-based 
Latinobarómetro’s findings that over half of the population 
in Brazil, Panama, and Chile believe their respective 
countries to be making socio-economic progress.2 
 
Although poverty remains at levels higher than 20 percent of 
the population in most Latin American countries, trends 
indicate that the region is indeed making economic progress, 
leading The Financial Times to declare that, “Poverty is no 
longer what defines it; instead, it is the rising middle class.”3  
Even income inequality, long the bane of the region’s socio-
economic development, and the source of much of its 
historic political instability, has seen some improvements – 
                                                 
1 Bárcena, Alicia; Prado, Antonio; Kacef, Osvaldo; Malchik, Susana; 
“Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean,” 
Pg. 9, The United Nations, December 2010. 
2 “The Latinobarómetro Poll: The Democratic Routine,” The Economist, 
December 2nd, 2010. 
3 Rathbone, John Paul, “Latin America: No Longer the Man with a Moustache 
and a Guitar,” The Financial Times, November 22nd, 2010. 
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particularly in Ecuador, Paraguay, and Brazil – although the 
region as a whole remains the most unequal in the world.4 
 
This net economic progress has also led to positive 
implications for the region’s democracy, reports LAPOP.  
Macroeconomic stability may have prevented not only a 
more serious economic crisis, but also a region-wide decline 
in political legitimacy, and perhaps even threats to the 
consolidation of the democratic regime.  More broadly 
speaking, surveys indicated that democratic attitudes, and the 
legitimacy of the political system itself, have turned out to be 
surprisingly resilient, with 69.8 per cent of the region in 
support of democracy. 
 
Furthermore, Latin America has become more tolerant.  
When LAPOP asked citizens whether government critics – 
those criticizing either an incumbent government, its 
policies, or the political system as a whole – should be 
allowed to vote, conduct peaceful demonstrations, run for 
public office, and give speeches on television, approximately 
55 percent of the region indicated approval.5  This trend 
towards tolerance and openness to new ideas have had a 
correlating effect on Latin American economics, translating 
into mixed approaches that include both State regulation and 
greater integration into the international global economy.  
This heterodox conception is expressed by former Brazilian 
President Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva, who has spoken of the 
need for the State “to intervene when the market fails,” yet 
he too would be counted amongst the 71 percent of Latin 
Americans that believe “private enterprise is essential for 
[their] country’s development.”6 
 
                                                 
4 “Societies on the Move,” The Economist, September 9th, 2010.
5 Ibid., Slides 47 and 48. 
6 “Lula’s Legacy,” The Economist, September 30th, 2010; “The Latinobarómetro 
Poll: The Democratic Routine,” The Economist, December 2nd, 2010. 
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Despite these positive political and economic trends, 
however, Latin America remains politically vulnerable.  This 
is especially salient when analyzing the combination of 
political tolerance and system support as indications of 
“democracy at risk.”  Haiti tops the list among 26 countries 
analyzed as having its democratic regime most at risk.  It is 
followed, unexpectedly perhaps, by Peru and Paraguay.  At 
the bottom of the list are Costa Rica and Uruguay, 
maintaining their historical positions as the region’s most 
stable democracies.  As a whole, growing public insecurity – 
as seen in the proliferation of violence, gangs, corruption, 
and the States’ inability to provide protection – is 
diminishing support for democracy. 
 
Also, the region’s economic success is largely based on 
mineral exports fueled by high commodity prices.  Peru’s 8.6 
percent growth rate can largely be attributed to the high 
prices for gold, silver, copper, and zinc sales in the 
international market.7  The source for these high prices has 
largely been China’s seemingly insatiable demand for 
agricultural products and minerals, which has made the 
Asian giant, rather than the U.S., Brazil’s number one 
trading partner.8  Both are emblematic of the larger, region-
wide phenomenon that Latin America is still – as it has been 
throughout its history – dependent on raw material exports.  
The region’s lack of innovation and disregard for intellectual 
property rights only strengthen this claim.  Finding an 
alternative path to this dependence is crucial to Latin 
America’s long-term political and socio-economic prospects, 
and can only be truly and fundamentally addressed through 
improvements in education. 
 
                                                 
7 Bárcena, Alicia; Prado, Antonio; Kacef, Osvaldo; Malchik, Susana; op.cit.; 
Oppenheimer, Andrés, “Peru May Be Region’s Next Success Story,” The Miami 
Herald , October 14th, 2010. 
8 Lopez, Luciana, “BRIC Breaking: Brazil’s China Syndrome,” Reuters, 
September 24th, 2010. 
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Education has become the Achilles’ heel of Latin American 
development.  Aside from some occasional exceptions,9 
schools from pre-school to graduate school levels provide 
low-quality education that fail to meet the needs of countries 
and students and prepare them for a competitive global 
economy.  Students are finishing at the bottom in nearly all 
global student achievement tests, and when it comes to 
science in particular, students are receiving marks that lie at 
or below the lowest levels possible.  According to the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), these scores indicate that the societies in question 
will not be able to participate actively in science and 
technology industries or related industrial trends and events.  
 
This negative economic assessment of the region’s education 
systems is surpassed only by the social implications, as LAC 
schools do little to reduce inequality.  Poor children tend to 
begin school later in age, fail and repeat more grades, drop 
out sooner, and score lower on standardized tests than their 
more affluent peers, regardless of their gender, race, 
ethnicity, or area of residence.  Children of the rich attend 
well-funded private schools of reasonable quality, while the 
poor receive third-rate education in underfunded and poorly 
managed public schools.  University level education in the 
region also suffers from the paradox of having the most 
affluent attend State-funded institutions – because they meet 
the grade and exam based criteria for admittance and attend 
for free or reduced tuition – while poor students, whose 
economic situation the State system was designed for, cannot 
gain admittance because of their inability to fulfill the exam 
entrance requirements, perpetuating the regional educational 
crisis. 
 
LAC government social spending also paradoxically tends to 
benefit the richest part of the population more than the 
                                                 
9 Brazil has become a leader in tropical medicine, biofuel, and food crop PhD 
research. 
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poorest.  In several countries, for example, 80 percent of 
social security benefits go to the wealthiest 40 percent of the 
population, and only 3 percent go to the poorest 10 percent.  
The size of informal economies – more than 40 percent in 
many Latin American countries – reduces both productivity 
growth and fiscal revenues, and is largely caused by 
government bureaucracy and an inability to effectively tax 
revenues.  A lack of sensible fiscal policies means that tax 
burdens are increasingly placed on the middle class.  Finally, 
the practice of taxing capital and land very lightly to promote 
investment, while taxing labor very heavily, leads to growth 
that fails to generate a significant amount of jobs – resulting 
in growing inequality and dependence on illegal and 
informal economies for many. 
 
Vulnerable populations are usually the most affected by the 
inequalities in society.  And because of where they often 
live, they are increasingly impacted by issues such as 
environmental degradation, land use and tenure issues, and 
the effects from the exploitation of natural resources.  
Indigenous and marginalized groups have responded with 
growing protests, particularly in the Andean countries, 
creating socially and ethnically-based organizations to gain 
political influence. Such groups have reached national power 
in Bolivia and the rights of indigenous people have indeed 
expanded under the presidency of Evo Morales, whose 
policies are contributing to Bolivians’ realization of the need 
for a more integrated society.  Yet, most other countries still 
fail to even incorporate the rights of indigenous populations 
in their constitutions. 
 
Repeated judicial and constitutional reforms have created 
many ambiguous laws and precedents subject to political 
influence and interpretation, often criticized for creating 
conditions of legal impunity for many individuals.  The 
inability or unwillingness of the legal systems in most 
countries to eliminate or reduce impunity has contributed to 
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the growing distrust by citizens in their legal institutions.  
Corruption in the judicial systems often denies access to 
justice to large segments of populations – while in some 
countries the judicial systems are completely defunct.  The 
exceedingly poor quality of corrections systems has 
essentially created universities for criminals to learn how to 
perfect their illegal practices and living nightmares for the 
innocent.     
 
Finally, the region has seen a setback in press freedom.  
There is growing soft and hard censorship, including the 
intimidation and even assassination of journalists in several 
countries.  Relations between the media and the State have 
deteriorated through the region, and there is a growing 
concentration of media ownership in few hands.  A 
foreboding legal environment is emerging through laws 
designed to weaken freedom of information through the 
censorship of media outlets and the limitation of access to 
media sources.  This has coincided with the perception that 
news coverage is failing to adequately address the challenges 
and issues (environment, health, and rural issues) faced by 
citizens in many countries.  All of these are factors that 
affect the quality of democracy, as they leave the public 
uninformed and unable to address their grievances and 
claims in the public forum of ideas, ultimately reducing their 
faith in democratic systems of government. 
 
NATURAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISK 
 
The bi-continental expanse of Latin America and the 
Caribbean contains areas highly susceptible to the effects of 
natural disasters.  2010 gave two examples of contrasting 
experiences with Haiti and Chile in the level of damage and 
the capacity to recover from their earthquakes.  The ultimate 
lesson learned was that the least developed the country, the 
greater the impact of the destruction and scale of the disaster.  
Both cases also illustrated the need for the immediate 
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reestablishment of national authority and the continuity of 
government following a natural disaster.  
 
Environmental risks that can lead to disasters are also present 
in the region.  Continued deforestation of the Amazon would 
likely compound global warming, potentially leading to 
droughts across large portions of Latin America.  This would 
have devastating effects on food production from Argentina 
to Brazil, as well as lead to the collapse of some of the most 
bio-diverse ecosystems in the world.  Cross-sector 
competition for water resources exists between power, 
agriculture, industry, and drinking water.  More than 100 
dams are being built throughout the region, affecting local 
residential access to water resources, and often exacerbating 
existing border disputes.  There are also concerns with the 
spread of communicable diseases, as migration increases to 
city slums that lack potable water and sanitation.  Population 
pressures in cities are presenting higher risks of 
infrastructure deterioration, while insufficient attention to 
technical trades – such as training electricians and mechanics 
– also places at risk the ability of some nations to maintain 
electrical grids and water and sanitation infrastructures.  The 
lack of appropriate infrastructures again reinforces citizens’ 
perception that governments cannot even provide basic 
services in exchange for their political support. 
 
ILLICIT ACTIVITIES TRANSFORM THE REGION 
 
Among the most prevailing challenges reshaping the security 
agenda in LAC is the rise of illicit activity, namely narcotics 
trafficking.  This activity has historically resided in 
Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru.  However, globalization has 
drastically enhanced illicit traffickers’ ability to adjust to 
pressures from international law enforcement agencies, 
moving people and goods across borders with relative ease.  
It has also enabled the creation of new markets in developing 
countries, increasing demand.  For example, over the past 
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four years there has been a 30 percent decrease in cocaine 
reaching the U.S., but there has been an upsurge in drug-
trafficking through South America.  This is a result of an 
increase in alternative transshipment routes from Colombia, 
Bolivia, and Peru to Brazil and Argentina to final 
destinations in Africa and Europe.  Portions of these 
shipments remain in South America during transit, 
particularly because Brazil and Argentina have become 
major drug-consuming markets.   
 
Central America remains the major corridor for drugs 
reaching the U.S and Canada.  From Panama to Guatemala 
the presence of DTOs has dramatically increased, many 
seeking to escape the pressures of Colombian and Mexican 
counter-drug initiatives.  The States’ inability to address their 
persistent socio-political and economic challenges – and 
their lack of interest in and capacity to address criminality 
even unrelated to drug trafficking – makes their societies 
extremely vulnerable to the effects of these DTOs.  For 
example, violence is on the rise in the northern triangle – 
Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras – a region that has 
already been dubbed by the UN Development Program as the 
most violent region in the world, in large part because of the 
region’s civil wars of the 1980’s, the corruption and abuse of 
law enforcement prominent within its countries, the resulting 
alienation of large segments of its societies, and the rise of 
large and violent gangs known as maras .  The Caribbean 
now has the world’s second highest per capita murder rate.  
And nearly half of Latin Americans polled feel “very unsafe” 
(LAPOP), to the extent that concerns over crime have 
increasingly surpassed those of unemployment since 2008 
(Latinobarómetro ).10   
  
While powerful DTOs are indeed challenging the States’ 
ability to govern effectively, many such States have long 
                                                 
10 “The Latinobarómetro Poll: The Democratic Routine,” The Economist, 
December 2nd, 2010.
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been governed ineffectively.  Therefore, in some cases, the 
loyalty of local populations has shifted from governments to 
criminal organizations, often in localities where the latter is 
more able to provide basic services and security for the 
community, often leading to incidents where citizens are 
protecting drug-lords.  This was made evident in Jamaica in 
2010 – when citizens attempted to protect Christopher 
“Dudus” Coke from local law enforcement authorities that 
sought to extradite him to the U.S. – and has also been 
common in Colombia’s rural areas, Rio de Janeiro’s favelas, 
and across Haiti before and after the 2010 earthquake. 
 
 The growing crime and insecurity and the inability of LAC 
States to effectively resist it is leading to the privatization of 
traditional government security functions.  Across Central 
America and the Caribbean, private security companies are 
being sought to step in and attempt to provide basic security 
services to fill the State’s capacity deficit.  Such companies 
are often better equipped and trained than national and local 
police forces and employ current and former military and 
law enforcement officials.  However, they also display the 
same problems that plague public institutions, sometimes 
moonlighting as paramilitaries and committing crimes while 
ostensibly combating other criminal groups.  Rio de Janeiro 
and numerous cities in Colombia provide prime examples 
where ineffectively demobilized paramilitaries have 
rebranded themselves as private security companies, but 
remain as predatory, violent, and pernicious as ever.  
Ultimately, the trend towards criminal activity and the 
corresponding increase in the use of private security 
companies will likely continue to reduce the State’s 
monopoly on law enforcement. 
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LATIN AMERICAN MILITARIES:  RETURNING FROM 
THE BARRACKS? 
 
Neither military nor police can act as sole executor of 
citizen security  
  
As comparisons are increasingly made between today’s 
Central American drug cartels and those of Colombia two 
decades prior, there might be more calls for the military, 
security, and law enforcement institutions to single-handedly 
“solve the problem.”  However, Mexico’s experience alone 
shows the ineffectiveness of this approach.  Approximately 
45,000 troops and thousands of federal law enforcement 
officers have been deployed since 2006 to combat the 
nation’s DTOs – a dual-approach being taken because 
Mexico’s weak and corrupt police force had initially proved 
itself unfit for the task – yet these federal deployments have 
failed to significantly reduce drug-related violence, as more 
than 30,000 people died over the four years since the federal 
government began its anti-DTO campaign.11  In other 
countries, corruption within the military and police is so 
widespread that neither group can be relied upon to establish 
or reestablish citizen security.  And additional calls for 
combining the two forces may simply garner military-police 
conflicts. 
 
At the regional level, combined U.S.-Latin American 
counter-drug efforts must move beyond their focus on 
interdiction and punishment.  Since the 1980’s, it has been 
demonstrated that these initiatives deal with only the effects 
of the problems, and in many cases exacerbate them.  For 
example, prisons in the U.S and Central America have been 
known to serve as training and recruitment centers that 
actually enhance the ability of organized crime to maintain 
                                                 
11 “Mexico Bodies Found After Shoot Out with Police,” The Telegraph, August 
26th, 2010; “Mexico’s Drug War: Number of Dead Passes 30,000,” BBC, 
December 16th, 2010. 
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its cohesion.  Therefore, regional efforts must become more 
holistic in nature and address fundamental sources of 
instability, particularly by promoting legal, intelligence, and 
social welfare reform.     
 
On the national and local levels, governments might do well 
to perform the following:  
 
1.  Commit to multi-dimensional police reform that includes 
continued education, a dignified wage, preparation for 
various police units and tactics, and a demand for principled 
conduct (i.e., no tolerance for corruption, extortion, or abuse 
of power). 
 
2.  Reassert  State presence in “alternatively governed 
spaces” (AGS’s).  While this is often achieved through 
military or militarized-police force, regard for human rights 
must be a governing principle within such operations. 
 
3. Maintain the State’s subsequent presence (“seize and 
hold”) through the presence of regular law enforcement and 
security forces, or through topos / “ground hog” units.  A 
topo unit consists of a 10-member squad that carries both 
revolvers and high-caliber rifles and patrols areas at frequent 
intervals. 
  
4. Regain citizen trust through “community policing,” 
“rotational policing,” or a combination of the two.  The idea 
of local, permanent police forces is appealing, because one 
can get to know his or her protector.  However, local officers 
have also been known to make friends with the local 
criminals, provoking calls for rotational police units.  
   
5.   Expand citizens’ access to justice, support for the rule of 
law, and human rights to address LAC’s crisis of impunity. 
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6.  Implement prison reform that provides additional building 
capacity, more secure facilities that effectively cut inmates’ 
ties to outside criminal groups, and holistic rehabilitation 
programs that re-integrate prisoners with society when it is 
deemed safe and responsible to do so. 
  
7. Create opportunities  for legal employment while 
simultaneously increasing the State’s capacity to render 
services such as water, electricity, health care, and improved 
education to affected communities. 
 
8.  Encourage community involvement to give citizens a new 
stake in a common future, and to create new spaces for social 
capital to emerge.    
 
As a whole, information is crucial to fighting crime 
effectively.  There is a need for reliable indicators, as well as 
public data on individuals, to help governments and 
companies conduct investigative work.  Information sharing 
is also key and could perhaps be improved by bringing inter-
agency models to Latin America.  Characteristics of crime 
organizations also need to be better understood.  While small 
gangs need to be dismantled, going after larger criminal 
organizations may continue to be a better strategy, 
particularly because larger organizations are the ones that are 
increasing utilizing these small gangs.  Furthermore, not all 
organizations conduct the same types of activities, making it 
necessary to discriminate their functions for more effective 
responses. 
 
PART OF THE PROBLEM RATHER THAN THE 
SOLUTION? 
 
Large-scale revenue-driven military corruption is eroding the 
containment of illicit activities.  Recent investigative news 
reports appear to indicate diverse scenarios where corrupt 
military actors have found new ways of securing consistent 
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illegal sources of income.  While isolated incidents of 
bribery, illegal arms sales, kidnapping, drug-trafficking, 
money-laundering, and robbery can be found amongst 
various military personnel across the region, other scenarios 
appear to be offering steady sources of illegal revenue, and 
to therefore be more characteristic of large-scale, 
institutional corruption.  Border guards within the 
Dominican Republic’s Specialized Border Security Corps, or 
CESFRONT, for example, are accused of regularly accepting 
bribes to overlook the trafficking of Haitian children into 
their country.  In Venezuela, the recently captured drug-
trafficker Walid Makled claims to have intermittently paid as 
many as fifteen Venezuelan generals to both protect him and 
usher drug shipments through the Caracas Maiquetía 
airport.12   
 
More research is needed to see how corruption is organized 
within the ranks; whether it is the result of individual 
soldiers or officers acting on their own, or if it is limited to 
specific units or stratified hierarchically within the military 
structure.  These elements would contribute to a better 
understanding of knowing when trust might be an issue when 
dealing with military institutions.  It would also assist in 
identifying areas that need strengthened, such as offices of 
Inspector Generals, codes of ethics, procurement and 
contracting processes, forensic abilities, and more.  As for 
U.S., it could do its part by making military assistance 
contingent upon greater transparency and accountability on 
how the institutions and their senior officials are funded.      
 
A NEW ROLE FOR THE MILITARY? 
 
The increased use of the military as a police force, growing 
expenditures, and new cases of large-scale revenue-driven 
                                                 
12 “Walid Makled Hace Nuevas Revelaciones: ‘Los Militares Me Protegieron,’” 
El Nacional, November 14th, 2010;  “El Hombre Que Sabe Demasiado,” Semana, 
November 6th, 2010.  
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corruption call for not only a reassessment of Latin 
American military powers, but perhaps also a new directive 
that could make better use of Armed Forces energies.  For 
example, Brazilian, Colombian, and U.S. militaries all came 
to the aid of Haiti after the destructive 7.0-scale earthquake 
hit the country on January 12, 2010.13  One month later, 
approximately 10,000 Chilean troops acted as “first-
responders” to their own country’s 8.8-magnitude 
earthquake, successfully restoring order to communities 
affected by panic and looting.14   
 
Such international and domestic military response skills 
could be promoted as a template for other Latin American 
militaries and perhaps even institutionalized.  A regional 
multinational response force could even be created.  
Militaries often bear equipment, organizational structures, 
and rapid-response capacities that other domestic actors lack.  
Brought under the directive of natural disaster response, 
militaries could better serve their resource-strapped 
governments in moments of crisis and further reinforce their 
value and service to democratic governments.  However, 
should such mandates ultimately be enacted, it will require 
that a certain percentage of traditional conventional arms 
purchases be re-directed towards disaster-response 
equipment, a move likely to garner various degrees of 
contestation and support. 
 
INFLUENCE IN FLUX 
 
Latin America and the Caribbean face transnational and 
multi-dimensional challenges that surpass the capacity of 
either the U.S. or any other single State.  However, while 
over the past decade the U.S.’ attention has focused on areas 
outside of Latin America – with the exception of Colombia – 
                                                 
13 Mora, Frank O., “The Top 7 Myths of U.S. Defense Policy Toward the 
Americas,” Pg. 7, University of Miami, April 29th, 2010. 
14 “Counting the Cost; Chile’s Earthquake,” The Economist, March 6th, 2010. 
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there has been an increasing consensus that it must reengage 
the region.  
 
The state of the West remains critical to Latin America.  The 
most significant threat to the stability, security, prosperity 
and welfare of the region for the next few years may be the 
prospect of deepening recession and eventual inflation in the 
U.S., Europe, and in the global economy in general.  
Furthermore, there is the possibility of growing tensions 
among the G-8 and G-20 nations on how to manage the 
world economy, which could lead to the outbreak of 
currency manipulations and protectionist policies.  Latin 
America may not be so much a source of economic 
instability as it is a likely victim of it in the era of 
globalization.  
 
New foreign powers – as other nations have done in the past 
– are securing natural resources in LAC.  China, Iran, 
Russia, and perhaps soon India, covet the region’s oil, 
lithium, uranium, and other valuable resources.  The nature 
of Chinese and Iranian relations can best be understood by 
their respective key partnerships in Latin America: China’s 
strong economic relations with Brazil and Iran’s ideological 
engagement with Venezuela, Nicaragua, Ecuador, and 
Bolivia.  There is also a sense of competition with the U.S. in 
terms of who will have preferential access to these resources, 
from sources of alternative energy to sources critical to new 
technologies – particularly in the case of lithium. 
 
Within the region, Brazil represents the most determined 
regional and international actor.  Mexico’s internal drug 
violence has limited its ability to play a significant role in 
LAC.  Cuba’s new leadership is more concerned with 
domestic rather than foreign issues and instead, it is relying 
on Venezuela to carry the anti-American banner.  However, 
Venezuela’s capacity to maintain its own level of influence 
seems to have peaked, as it faces profound internal political 
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and economic crises.  Simultaneously, other regional 
countries that could utilize sufficient political and economic 
leverage to increase their influence, like Chile, apparently 
have concluded that it is not in their interests to do so. 
 
BRAZIL:  ARE WE THERE YET? 
 
As China did in 2008, Brazil is preparing to make an 
unprecedented statement to the world that it has finally 
entered the ranks of the global powers in the 21st century, 
hosting the FIFA World Cup in 2014 and the Summer 
Olympics in 2016.  Oil and gas discoveries from 2007 and 
2008, if estimates are correct, will make Brazil a major 
energy producer, enhancing its regional and international 
influence.  Brazil has steadily increased its role in both the 
hemisphere and the international community in pursuit of its 
aspirations, yet it seems uncertain on how to project its role 
as an emerging power.  While the “Lula Model” of moderate 
left politics is more appealing than the strident policies of 
some of its neighbors, Brazil still has no real development 
model to offer.  Nor has it completely defined its relationship 
with the U.S.   
 
Brazil and the U.S. share a commitment to democracy, and a 
desire for regional stability, but may increasingly differ on 
other issues.  Brazil desires a deeper bilateral relationship 
with the U.S. – similar to that which has been developed 
with India – yet there is no clear indication of what a Brazil-
U.S. partnership would look like.  Brazil is a key player in 
both the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and 
the South American Defense Council, South America’s two 
newest multilateral security organizations.  And its military 
has played major roles in the Haitian peacekeeping 
operations before and after the 2010 earthquake.  It is in the 
U.S. interest to collaborate with Brazil and the new regional 
security entities and to avoid repeating its delay in 
recognizing MERCOSUR when it was created in the 1990s. 
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 The Brazilian military has long resisted  cooperation with the 
U.S. on counternarcotics efforts.  However, now that Brazil 
is facing increased flows of drug traffic, new opportunities 
for collaboration may exist.  For example, the U.S. could 
oversee technology transfers that would place new drug-
interdiction radar systems into the Amazon.  Similarly, 
Brazilian efforts in eradicating drug lords from the favelas in 
Rio de Janeiro and other main cities could provide additional 
lessons learned when it comes to community policy, fighting 
organized crime, combating drug and arms trafficking, and 
understanding the pernicious effects of local corruption and 
private security organizations.  Brazil could even use such 
knowledge to support Mexico’s anti-DTO offensive, an 
initiative that could both assist a fellow LAC nation and 
enhance its regional leadership simultaneously. 
 
VENEZUELAN INFLUENCE UNRAVELING? 
 
Despite anticipation that President Hugo Chávez’s region-
wide vision of 21st Century Socialism might strengthen and 
spread, it appears to be gaining no new followers in the 
region.  The ousting of Honduras’ President Manuel Zelaya 
in 2009 seems to have tempered enthusiasm for Venezuelan 
anti-Americanism rhetoric in Latin America.  Yet, the 
Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América 
(ALBA, Spanish acronym for Bolivarian Alliance for the 
Americas) has provided significant economic assistance to 
several member and observer States, particularly in the 
Caribbean.  Because of its close link to the Venezuelan 
economy, the very success of ALBA is dependent on 
continued Venezuelan oil sales at stable prices, and the 
ability of Chavez to manage internal political challenges.   
 
 
 
 23 
 
CHINA CONTINUES TO DEEPEN  IT’S PRESENCE 
 
Generally speaking, China-Latin American relations have 
largely been driven by economic considerations, primarily 
access to markets and resources.  China’s trade with the 
region reached US$121.5 billion in 2009, and trade between 
China and Brazil increased 12-fold between 2001 and 2009, 
making it Brazil’s largest commercial partner.  China will 
displace the European Union as the region's second-largest 
trading partner by the middle of 2011.  Though slow to 
materialize, Chinese investments in Latin America are now 
in the billions, with several major deals having come about 
over the last few years, i.e. US$28 billion in loans to 
Venezuela, with another US$16 billion committed to oil 
exploration in the Orinoco; US$10 billion to Argentina to 
modernize its rail system, and US$3.1 billion to purchase the 
Argentine oil company BRIDAS; a US$1 billion advance 
payment to Ecuador in exchange for petroleum; US$4.4 
billion committed to Peru; and almost US$20 billion to 
Brazil in exchange for of oil and steel.15  Indeed, it is China’s 
economic engagement in Latin America that both offset the 
global economic crisis of 2008 and helped solidify its 
influence throughout the region.16  
 
IRANIAN AND RUSSIAN INFLUENCES REMAIN 
MARGINAL   
  
Latin America and the Caribbean has seen an increase in an 
Iranian foreign policy that engages populist, less democratic 
governments such as Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua, 
and Ecuador and follows a more ideological, anti-American 
discourse as the only principle uniting this extraordinary 
coalition.  Hugo Chavez, Iran’s biggest ally in the region, has 
                                                 
15 Ellis, R. Evan. “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study”, 
National Defense University Press, Issue 60, 1st quarter 2010. 
16  One important exception to China’s trade with the region is Mexico, which 
sees China as a competitor to U.S. markets access.   
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helped foster and/or strengthen these relationships.  Iran has 
also engaged Brazil and Mexico, though with much less 
success.  Iran seems to be seeking international alliances to 
overcome years of UN sanctions and international pressures 
that have countered its pursuit of nuclear power.  Iran’s 
economic activities in the region have increased, particularly 
in Venezuela, where it has signed more than 20 cooperative 
agreements in recent years.  Economic ties between Iran and 
Latin America are marginal and less viable than those of 
China and Russia, and many of Iran’s financial commitments 
have not been realized.  More recently, there have been 
allegations that Iran is seeking uranium in Venezuela, though 
this has not been confirmed.  To date, there are no known 
significant uranium deposits in Venezuela.  However, such 
deposits do exist in neighboring Guyana.  Nonetheless, in the 
context of influence, if Venezuelan influence is stagnating 
then Iran will find it difficult to maintain long-term relations 
in LAC. 
  
In the past few years Russia has also increased its ties with 
Latin America, notably through an increase in arms sales that 
jumped 900 percent between the time periods of 1999-2003 
and 2004-2008.17  Russia also signed nuclear-related 
memoranda with several Latin American countries in 2009, 
including Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela.  Despite these 
activities, however, Russian influence remains relatively low 
when compared to that of the U.S. and China.  
 
DOES THE U.S. STILL LEAD?  
 
Despite the growing presence of China, and the fact that the 
U.S. has over time decreased its own engagement with LAC, 
the U.S. remains the most influential actor within the 
Western Hemisphere.  Trade between the U.S. and LAC 
countries totaled just over US$500 billion in 2009, a 
                                                 
17 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2009. 
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significant increase from the 2004 figure of US$427 
billion.18  And although China has greatly increased its own 
regional trade, U.S. trade is still four times greater – 
affording the U.S. a much larger economic footprint, as well 
as the ability to wield greater influence.  Culturally, LAC 
societies have greater linkages with the U.S. than any other 
country outside of the hemisphere.  Politically, the U.S.’ 
commitment to the promotion of democracy and human 
rights remains relevant to the claims and aspirations of LAC 
societies.  The U.S. also continues to enjoy positive popular 
perceptions within the region.  In 2010, U.S. leadership 
approval ratings were as high as 62 percent in Chile and El 
Salvador, 58 percent in Colombia, and 50 percent in Peru.  In 
countries where governments promote anti-American 
policies, perceptions were still relatively high: Nicaragua, 
Bolivia, and Venezuela featured approval ratings of 40 
percent and Ecuador, 44 percent.19  
 
U.S.-LAC military-to-military relations remain strong, even 
if U.S. military policies are often viewed with suspicion, as 
demonstrated by the support for President Rafael Correa’s 
decision not to renew a U.S. military lease in Manta, 
Ecuador, and the region-wide controversy over a 2009 
proposal to allow the U.S. to use Colombian military bases.  
In 2010, Brazil signed its first major military agreement with 
the U.S. since 1977, providing “for cooperation in research 
and development, information exchanges, and [a relationship 
that] allows for joint military exercises and training.”20  Later 
                                                 
18 Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars. “Latin America in 2010: 
Opportunities, Challenges and the Future of the U.S. Policy in the Hemisphere,” 
Cynthia Arnson testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere on December 1, 2010.  
19 Gallup, “U.S. Leadership Ratings Suffer In Latin America:  Approval Still up 
from Brush Era,”  December 10, 2010. 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/145127/leadership-ratings-suffer-latin-
america.aspx?version=print.  
20 Cárdenas, Mauricio, and de Castro Neves, João Augusto. “Brazil and the 
United States: A New Beginning?” Brookings Institution, April 19, 2010. 
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0419_us_brazil_cardenas.aspx. 
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that year, the U.S. and Peru renewed a commitment to joint 
military engagement.21   
 
Opportunities and challenges still remain for the U.S. to 
deepen its relationship with LAC.  Such engagement must be 
focused and sustained, with an emphasis on thinking 
preventively and in partnership  with LAC.  Strategic 
partnerships – particularly those with Brazil and Mexico – 
should be cultivated, and increased attention paid to the 
weak States and the illicit activities that plague the Central 
American region.  In essence, the U.S. remains an 
appreciated conflict resolution resource for the region. 
 
                                                 
21 Andina. “Peru, U.S. Renew Military Cooperation”, Agencia Peruana de 
Noticias, August 3, 2010. 
http://www.andina.com.pe/Ingles/Noticia.aspx?Id=Qh86BvHC5ew=. 
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